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Abstract  
This paper compares the electoral authoritarian regimes of Turkey and Russia and how state 
capacity has facilitated authoritarian regime building at the expense of democratic 
consolidation. It begins by considering how best to conceptualise the Putin and Erdoğan 
regimes. Whilst recognising significant differences between the two cases we argue that the 
concepts of electoral authoritarianism and neo-patrimonialism are particularly helpful in 
better understanding how both systems operate. The paper then discusses the concept of state 
capacity, arguing that for conceptual clarity a parsimonious understanding of the concept 
based on the state’s extractive, administrative and coercive capacities, provides the most 
useful framework for the comparative analysis. Ultimately, the paper concludes that of the 
two cases in Turkey, for a variety of reasons, the shift towards a form of electoral 
authoritarianism since 2010/2011 has been much shorter, more conflictual and characterized 
by more elite and social contention than in Russia under Putin. The Putinist regime was much 
more capable of harnessing the infrastructural and coercive capacity of the Russian state to 
institute a stable neo-patrimonial and authoritarian regime that could function in a setting of 
electoral authoritarianism. In both cases, these projects of authoritarian regime building came 
at the expense of or supplanted efforts to improve and expand state capacity for effective 
democratic governance. 
 
Turkey; Russia; electoral authoritarianism; neo-patrimonialism; state capacity 
 
Introduction 
Until Turkey’s downing of a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M on the Turkish-Syrian border in 
November 2015 relations between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had become 
increasingly cordial, the two presidents drawn together perhaps by the commonalities 
between their regimes. Nevertheless, despite policy differences over Syria, both leaders 
recognized the importance of a strategic alliance and by July 2016, bilateral rapprochement 
efforts were under way to repair this serious rift in relations. The popularity of both 
presidents has largely been fuelled by nationalism: support for Putin increasing significantly 
after the annexation of Crimea in 2014; Erdogan’s electoral victory in November 2015 in no 
small part the result of nationalist rhetoric and a hard line against Kurdish insurgents. Both 
presidencies have been built on ‘great nation’ rhetoric and a vilification of the West and both 
regimes have been ruthless in suppressing internal dissent. While in Turkey this was 
evidenced by the authorities’ brutal response to the 2013 Gezi Park protests and during the 
renewed Kurdish insurgency in the south-east, in Russia it was the regime’s crackdown on 
civil society and political opposition following large-scale protests in Moscow during the 
winter of 2011-12. Both presidents have emphasized the importance of national sovereignty, 
often accusing foreign countries of domestic interference. However, despite the many points 
of similarity between the Turkish and Russian political systems which have become 
increasingly evident over the last decade, comparative work on Turkey and Russia is still 
relatively scarce. Analysis has tended to focus on either their bilateral relations, often through 
the lens of energy geo-politics or wider international politics, or on similarities relating to 
political administration, governance and leadership styles of Presidents Putin and Erdoğan 
(Hill and Taşpınar 2006; Warhola and Mitchell 2006; Yilmaz 2012). 
Although contextual differences abound across the two cases, there are several particular 
dimensions and factors that open up multiple spaces for comparison between the Russian and 
Turkish state- and nation-building experiences. Both countries are successors to large multi-
ethnic empires whose collapse at the end of World War One paved the way to the 
establishment of semi-revolutionary, modernist and top-down regimes. In Turkey, the 
Kemalist one-party state was in power for around 20 years. Multi-party elections were 
gradually introduced in 1946. In Russia, the totalitarian Soviet regime was in power from 
1918 until its collapse in 1991 (although the regime might better be conceptualized as ‘post-
totalitarian’ during the Gorbachev era). In both countries, the imperial legacy entailed a 
historical continuity with practices and norms of state-building and governance prescribing a 
strongly statist, centrist and monist political culture. In this sense, the state is protected and 
isolated from its subjects’ demands, forms the core of all social and political interaction, and 
led to the existence of a weak and fragmented civil associational sphere with little input into 
political transformations and changes (Bacık 2001, 55). 
In both cases, the post-authoritarian political trajectories have been characterized by: weak 
institutionalization of democratic governance and representation; significant abuse of power 
and political instability; significant non-democratic veto players and authoritarian enclaves 
that distorted and impeded democratic consolidation; and a heightened risk of direct 
authoritarian interventions. In terms of their international ties with the transatlantic West, 
both countries have tended to be historically placed in an ambiguous, semi-peripheral 
relationship with it, seeing it as both a source of inspiration for their statist and social 
modernization efforts as well as an existential threat. The Soviet period saw Russia 
attempting to redevelop itself as an alternative centre in global politics. Both have struggled 
to be accepted within the circle of the transatlantic West as strategic and cultural equals and 
their historical experiences of adopting modernity has engendered crises of self-placement 
and self-identification (Zarakol 2011).   
Our focus is on the relationship between state capacity and regime resilience and how this 
dynamic led, in both cases, to the establishment and consolidation of electoral authoritarian 
regimes at the expense of democratic consolidation. We begin by considering how best to 
conceptualize the contemporary regimes under Putin and Erdoğan. Whilst recognizing 
significant differences between the two cases, we argue that the concepts of electoral 
authoritarianism (and variants thereof) and neo-patrimonialism are particularly helpful in 
better understanding how both systems operate. We then discuss the concept of state 
capacity, arguing that for the purposes of conceptual clarity, a parsimonious understanding of 
the concept based on the state’s extractive, administrative and coercive capacities, provides 
the most useful framework for comparative analysis. 
Ultimately we conclude that for various reasons in Turkey, the shift towards an emerging 
regime based on electoral authoritarianism took place in a much shorter period, seriously 
commencing around 2010/11 and characterized by significantly more elite and social 
contention and crisis than in Russia under Putin. The Putin regime has been much more 
capable of harnessing the infrastructural and coercive capacities of the Russian state to 
institute a stable neo-patrimonial regime. As a result, electoral authoritarianism is more 
firmly entrenched in Russia than in Turkey, where elections are still much more important 
comparatively, although the latter’s political system in the last years has been increasingly 
resembling Russia more and more in that sense.  
In both cases, however, these projects of authoritarian regime building have clearly come at 
the expense of improving and expanding state capacity for effective democratic governance. 
It should be noted that the political situation in both countries remains fluid and difficult to 
assess at the time of writing, especially in Turkey which suffered a violent coup attempt in 
July 2016 and is currently governed under a nationwide state of emergency. 
 
1. Conceptualising the Putin and Erdoğan regimes 
Since the mid-1990s, the literature on regime analysis and democratization developed a 
plethora of concepts and typologies analyzing the nature and behaviour of semi-authoritarian 
regimes, neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian, or as Freedom House puts it, ‘partly 
free’. Seeking to draw a clear distinction between the electoral and liberal components of 
democracy, Zakaria suggested that whilst democracy was flourishing as the end of the 
century drew close, the electoral rather than the liberal variant had become dominant. Zakaria 
argued illiberal democracies were not only relatively stable but were also settling on systems 
that mixed democracy and illiberalism in equal measures (Zakaria 1997, 24). Larry Diamond 
(1996) drew similar conclusions, identifying two seemingly contradictory trends: the 
continued growth in electoral democracy and a stagnation in liberal democracy. Democracy 
was not expiring altogether, suggested Diamond, but in many cases was being ‘hollowed 
out’. Electoral democracies in which opposition parties were subject to harassment and 
marginalization, constitutions might be temporarily suspended and ruling elites paid lip 
service to internationally accepted standards whilst continuing to act repressively, were 
becoming the norm. The growth was in hybrid systems, essentially diminished forms of 
authoritarianism in which elections were simply window dressing, providing a sheen of 
democratic legitimacy for the non-democratic regime. 
For Zakaria, Russia in the 1990s was an example of an illiberal democracy and indeed, 
elections during the Yeltsin presidency elections may have been flawed but were still 
relatively free and fair. Zakaria did, however, express his concern at the creation of a super-
presidency in Russia in which Yeltsin had shown a disregard for constitutional checks and 
balances and, with some prescience hoped that ‘his successor will not abuse it’ (1997, 34). 
Similarly, although Zakaria (2007, 107) saw Turkey in the 2000s as ‘a flawed but functioning 
liberal democracy’ he has since described it as a ‘textbook illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria 
2015). If Russia had been an illiberal democracy in the 1990s, even in the early stages of the 
first Putin presidency few scholars were prepared to use any form of adjectival democracy to 
conceptualize the political system. In his seminal critique of the transition paradigm, 
Carothers (2002, 9) classified Russia under Putin as a hybrid regime, situated in the ‘political 
gray zone . . . between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship’. Levitsky and Way’s 
(2002) model of competitive authoritarianism, in which the regime falls short of meeting 
democratic criteria but cannot be described as wholly authoritarian, provided a useful 
framework for conceptualizing the Russian polity during Putin’s first term. Whilst democratic 
norms were routinely violated the regime was unable to eliminate democratic rules entirely. 
Since the 2003-4 parliamentary and presidential elections, however, the competitive 
component has all but disappeared, federal and regional elections having increasingly 
predictable outcomes.  
The ‘electoral authoritarian’ model may provide a more accurate conceptualization of the 
Russian and Turkish systems than simply labelling them as democratic variants. Multi-party 
elections may take place in an electoral authoritarian system but liberal-democratic principles 
of freedom and fairness are violated to such a degree as to neutralize the democratic nature of 
such elections, effectively making them instruments of authoritarian rule. Such a regime aims 
to ‘reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty’ 
(Schedler 2002, 37). Nevertheless, Schedler (2013, 6) emphasizes that despite the 
incumbent’s systematic manipulation, ‘elections matter’ even in electoral-authoritarian 
settings as their outcome is ‘contingent’ as they still grant extensive political space for 
political opposition, mobilization and interest aggregation. This was seen in Turkey’s June 
2015 national elections which deprived the ruling AKP of an overall majority for the first 
time since coming to power in 2002. It has been commonplace for scholars to conceptualize 
the Putin regime (Ross, 2005, 2011; Golosov, 2011; Brown, 2009; White 2013) and 
increasingly after 2010-11, the Turkish regime as ‘electoral authoritarian’ (Tillman 2015, 
Konak and Özgür Dönmez 2015, Arbatlı 2014). However, whilst electoral authoritarianism 
may provide a useful shorthand description of both systems it does not explain how those 
systems work in practice or fully consider the complexities of factors that underpin the 
regimes. Electoral authoritarianism may exist in both countries but, as this paper will explore, 
the regimes are established on and sustained by wider foundations than simply the 
management of elections. 
Thus we also use the lens of neo-patrimonialism to conceptualize the Russian and Turkish 
political systems. Scholars using electoral authoritarianism as a conceptual framework tend to 
focus solely on the tensions between gaining power through elections and ruling through 
authoritarian practices and are, at least implicitly, concerned with regime change and the 
possibility of such systems being replaced by electoral or liberal democracy. Electoral 
authoritarianism is a regime-centric concept and fails to take into account the existence of 
multiple tensions within a polity at both regime and state levels. A neo-patrimonial state 
cannot sustain itself simply by satisfying the needs of the ruling group and insulating itself by 
suppressing political opposition; it also has to satisfy the wider population through the 
provision of welfare through redistributive methods or by securing reasonable levels of 
economic growth (Robinson 2014, 9). This is borne out by the Russian and, increasingly, the 
Turkish case in which the suppression of civil society and political opposition has served to 
insulate the regime. Moreover, the consistently high levels of support enjoyed by the Putin 
regime are in no small measure the result of an effective level of resource redistribution. A 
neo-patrimonial regime with the capacity to produce an effective relationship between regime 
and state is likely to be sustainable. Its long-term stability is largely governed by its ability to 
consolidate the regime through elite agreement and to develop sufficient capacity to act as a 
substitute for the state in order to be able to deliver on security and welfare (Robinson 2014, 
11). As will be discussed below, Russian state capacity has been developed under Putin but it 
has essentially been used to consolidate the regime through highly personalized presidential 
rule, rather than aid state development. The provision of social welfare has been the result of 
the benefits of oil-fuelled economic development rather than being attributable to state policy 
and better management of the economy (Robinson 2014, 17-20). Despite Vladimir Putin’s 
expressed commitment to strengthening the Russian state, it can be argued that the regime 
has been primarily motivated by the desire to extract rents from the oil and gas industry. 
Regime resilience is largely the result of its unity and as many scholars have noted, elite unity 
is crucial in the consolidation of authoritarian rule (Way 2005; Higley and Gunther 1992; 
Geddes 1999). The personalized nature of the regime, in which the President is essentially the 
guarantor of regime legitimacy and social peace, has therefore provided a powerful incentive 
for elites to stay on board rather than risk challenging the leader (Smyth 2014, 574). As 
Gel’man (2015, 146) notes, Russia’s post-Soviet experience provides us with a text-book 
example of a power-grab by politicians facing little in the way of constraints. 
Neopatrimonialism was first used to describe Turkey’s political governance in the 1980s after 
civilian electoral politics were reintroduced. Although Kalaycioğlu (2005, 128-129) and 
Sözen (2013, 227) argue that it has been constantly present in state-society relations, neo-
patrimonalist practices of governance merged with the strong state tradition and became 
‘party-centred’ and after the introduction of electoral democracy. They became especially 
prominent during Turgut Özal’s premiership (1983-1991) and were passed onto succeeding 
governments. However, Turkey’s messy political scene in the 1990s, marked by economic 
turmoil, the sharp reflexes of military tutelage and the Kurdish conflict, prevented a stable 
regime of neo-patrimonial governance until midway through the AKP’s rule in the 2000s. 
Originating in the traditionally marginalized political Islamist movement, the AKP 
established sufficient institutional dominance during its second term in office to cement neo-
patrimonial rule.  
In contrast to carbon-rich Russia, Turkey’s political economy lacks any highly prized energy 
resources as a base for patrimonial rentierism. However, after the severe economic crash in 
2001, an IMF reform program brought about strong economic growth and stability during a 
period of high global liquidity compared to the unstable and recessionary 1990s. This 
economic stability and the unprecedented inflow of foreign direct investment contributed 
strongly to the AKP’s consecutive electoral victories since 2002. Its strong expansion of the 
public welfare system, bolstered by its nation-wide system of charitable patronage (Öniş 
2012, 140), significant infrastructural investment targeted at the growing middle classes, and 
its conservative-traditional outlook and image, allowed the AKP to fashion together strong, 
broad-based electoral support. Simultaneously, it gained the support of a strong and diverse 
coalition of economic interest-groups benefitting from the economic stability. Establishing 
electoral hegemony through consecutive electoral victories, the ruling party horizontally and 
vertically institutionalized its dominance across government, state and society, neutralising 
the Turkish armed forces politically. Its electoral hegemony and state capture paved the way 
for marked abuse of power, corruption and the increased blurring of state-government 
boundaries, abuse of power and corruption (Çarkoğlu 2011, 43). This dynamic began to 
accelerate sharply following the AKP’s third electoral victory in 2011. 
However, whilst both cases provide examples of the mobilization of regime support through 
the redistribution of rents, in contrast to the Russian case, the AKP’s combination of 
increasing electoral authoritarianism and neo-patrimonial governance only began to be 
seriously institutionalized after 2010-2011, proving too fragile to eliminate elite conflicts. 
This was especially seen in the growing rift between groups around Erdoğan and the Gülen 
movement which erupted in late 2013, causing considerable domestic turmoil and paralysis 
(Savran 2015, 83). The July 2016 coup attempt can be partially seen as a further mutation 
deriving from this confrontation. In contrast, Russia’s neo-patrimonial system helped to avoid 
elite conflict by binding political elites together and mobilising wider popular support 
through the dispersal of rents. 
 
2. State capacity – a framework for discussion 
Academic literature on state capacity has tended to focus primarily on the state’s role in 
consolidating democratization. In an ideal democracy, unthinkable in the absence of an 
established state (Linz and Stepan 1996, 17), we would expect the private interests of the 
ruler and officials to be largely institutionalized, an independent judiciary would enjoy the 
confidence of the citizens and the state would be served by disciplined and honest police 
forces. Moreover, in a democratic state, taxes would be collected ‘according to laws that 
treated categories of citizens more or less equally and for public purposes’ (Linz 1997, 118). 
The Russian and Turkish regimes’ lack of democratic credentials should not, however, 
preclude us from analysing the relationship between state capacity and regime resilience. 
Whilst the state-democracy link is certainly prevalent in scholarly research, some have sought 
to identify ways in which state capacity stabilizes authoritarian systems both in the former 
Soviet Union (Way 2005) and the Middle East (Bellin 2004). As Andersen et al note, 
although the mechanisms may differ (administrative capacity being more significant for 
democratic stability and coercive capacity more important in the case of autocratic systems) 
state capacity has the potential to sustain authoritarian systems just as much as it stabilizes 
democracies (2014, 1305). 
State capacity, however, remains a slippery concept to define. Whilst it is not within the 
scope of this paper to provide a detailed overview of the myriad of contrasting definitions, a 
brief analysis of scholarly works on the topic (Andersen et al 2014; Darden 2008; Fortin 
2010; Hanson and Sigman 2011; Melville and Stukal 2012; Migdal 1998) reveals only one 
commonly agreed indicator of state capacity: that of the state’s ability to raise taxes. Indeed, 
one of the main impediments to the effective comparative analysis of state capacity in any 
given country or countries is the expansiveness of the concept to include elements such as 
social stability, the existence of secessionist tendencies and incidences of conflict and 
legitimacy (Fortin 2010, 656). For the sake of comparative clarity therefore we utilize a 
parsimonious definition based on three dimensions of state capacity: extractive (and, by 
extension, redistributive) capacity, coercive capacity and administrative capacity. These three 
dimensions provide the basis of a functioning modern state and, as Hanson and Sigman 
(2013, 3) note, accord with what Skocpol argues are the components of state capacity: 
plentiful resources, administrative-military control of a territory and loyal and skilled officials 
(1985, 16). 
As noted above, extractive capacity, and particularly the capacity of the state to collect tax 
revenue, is most frequently identified by scholars as the key component underpinning state 
capacity. Those states in which governments are unable to finance their activities are unlikely 
to exhibit strong state capacity. As Easter contends, revenue, ‘enhances state strength, and 
strong states claim more revenue’ (2002, 603).  Analysing the link between state capacity and 
regime resilience, Andersen et al’s findings point to a clear and positive correlation between 
levels of extractive capacity and the stability of authoritarian regimes (2014, 1315-6).   
Coercive capacity can be seen as having two distinct dimensions: the repressive or coercive 
capacities of a state and the level of autonomy of the state from social pressures (Fortin-
Rittberger 2014, 1245). The first dimension is measured not just by the size of coercive 
forces but by the amount of control the state is able to exercise over them. The second 
dimension focuses on the operational independence of the regime from other institutions. 
Regimes relatively free of constitutional constraints are likely to exhibit higher levels of 
coercive power (2014, 1251). In the context of authoritarian settings, as state agencies are 
made to serve ‘partisan political ends’ (Way 2006, 167), coercive power is maintained and 
marshalled not simply to police wider society to prevent the emergence of horizontal threats 
but also lateral threats in the form of intra-regime challenges or palace coups.  
Administrative capacity, although a broader concept than the previous two elements, might be 
best seen as ‘the ability to develop policy, the ability to produce and deliver public goods and 
services, and the ability to regulate commercial activity’ (Hanson and Sigman 2013, 4). An 
effectively administered state requires certain levels of technical competence, trusted and 
professional state officials, transparent monitoring and coordination mechanisms, and 
effective reach across the state’s territory and its citizens (ibid.). As noted above, we might 
expect administrative effectiveness to be a more significant factor in the stabilization of 
democratic rather than authoritarian systems. However, as Andersen et al (2014, 1308) note 
the greatest source of legitimacy in democratic systems is performance, if a state is unable to 
deliver effective economic growth and redistribution it runs the risk of democratic 
breakdown. Whilst authoritarian systems are able to rely on coercion and repression to 
counteract less effective performance, in the long term they too are likely to be more stable if 
they are administered effectively. However, the ‘dual’ nature of administrative institutions in 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian settings in which these are subjected to neo-patrimonial 
partisan politicization (Way 2006, 170), may put more pressure on administrative efficiency 
than in democratic contexts. 
 
3. Comparing the cases 
3.1. Coercive capacity 
Michael Mann conceptualized coercive, or ‘despotic’ power as the ‘range of actions which 
the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil 
society groups’. In contrast infrastructural power reflected the state’s capacity to ‘penetrate 
civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm’ (1984, 
188). Mann expected the typical capitalist democracy to be ‘despotically weak’ but 
infrastructurally strong (1984, 189). In the Russian and Turkish case, however, Mann’s 
notion is clearly reversed. Both states appear to exhibit relatively strong despotic or coercive 
capacity but are much weaker in terms of their infrastructural and administrative capacity.  
The size and influence of Russia’s coercive institutions is self-evident. The Russian state has 
allocated vast resources to support its military, shown by its capacity to intervene militarily in 
neighbouring sovereign states (Georgia in 1998, Ukraine in 2014-5). Moreover, under Putin 
we have witnessed an increasing concentration of power and resources in the siloviki, those in 
the ‘power ministries’, notably representing the armed and security forces, the Federal 
Security Service (FSB), the Interior Ministry and the police. Coercive power therefore not 
only provides the Russian state with the capacity for military intervention in what it regards 
as its ‘near abroad’ but is also used to insulate the regime from potential social pressures 
particularly through the routine harassment of civil society activists, political opposition 
activists and the breaking up of peaceful protests and demonstrations. There is a danger, 
however, in over-estimating Russian coercive capacity. As Sinovets and Renz (2015, 5-6) 
highlight, although Russia’s military capabilities have undoubtedly improved under Putin, 
such developments must be seen in the context of years of neglect in the 1990s. What we 
have seen under Putin are essentially ‘salvaging measures’ rather than a significant increase 
in Russian military capacity, the Russian defence budget still remains significantly lower than 
that of the United States or China. The limits of Russian coercive capacity can also be seen in 
the case of the restive Chechen republic where a failing military strategy was replaced by a 
policy of ‘normalization’ which effectively outsourced governance to the ruling warlord in 
the region, Ramzan Kadyrov.   
On the domestic front the Russian regime has had sufficient coercive capacity to convince 
citizens not to take to the streets in protest. Just occasionally, however, the regime 
miscalculates. Tens of thousands demonstrated during the winter of 2011-12 following the 
flawed parliamentary elections and a sense of growing disillusionment with the 
announcement that Putin would be returning to stand in the 2012 presidential election. The 
costs of suppressing such large-scale protests, both in terms of domestic and international 
reaction, were simply too high for the authorities. As Stepan (1990, 46) notes, when facing a 
potential challenge to its legitimacy, a regime previously content to use coercive measures 
against small-scale protest may instead opt for tolerance. The regime’s pragmatic recognition 
of this dynamic serves to highlight the limits of Russian coercive capacity. 
In Turkey, the trajectory of state development during the Ottoman and republican periods 
privileged a top-down, centralist logic of rule with a strong coercive capacity broadly 
preserved in the republican polity. Turkey’s armed forces currently constitute NATO’s 
second-biggest military force. Mirroring the debate on the relationship between coercive and 
infrastructural power, Kalaycıoğlu (2012, 173) argues that the state’s strongly developed 
coercive focus actually hides its weak distributive capacity in the provision of public goods. 
The 2000s did see civil-military relations in Turkey transformed to an extent that weakened 
the tutelary hold of the armed forces over civilian politics although the July 2016 coup 
attempt showed that they were not as defanged as previously presumed. However, the police, 
the intelligence apparatuses and the judiciary simultaneously became overtly politicized by 
the government to pursue a variety of groups deemed as hostile and treasonous. As these 
arms of the state received increasing, often discretionary, powers, public dissidence and 
contention became increasingly policed, securitized and penalized. The wide range of 
repressive measures the government applied to discipline parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary forms of opposition and criticism drew increasing comparisons with Putin’s 
Russia (Göcer Akder and Herzog 2014, 510). Arguably in contrast to Russia, the shift of the 
Erdoğan-led AKP government, from a democratizing regime (2002-2010/11) to an 
increasingly authoritarian one after 2010-2011 was so rapid and fraught with tensions and 
contradictions that the emerging regime felt driven and empowered to harshly quash any 
challenges within the state or in public in accordance with Turkey’s tradition of state 
repression. The immediate and harsh repression of the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013, 
in which 8,000 people were estimated to have been injured and eight people killed, can be 
seen as a key critical juncture that marked the sharpening of the regime’s evolving 
authoritarianism. 
Clearly, in both cases, what coercive state capacity exists has been drawn on to bolster the 
regimes. A key difference is in the use of external coercive capacity. Although the extent of 
Russian military capacity may be questioned, it has been used by the Putin regime as a 
foreign policy tool to exert Russian influence in the former Soviet space which, in turn, has 
fed into a developing national-patriotic narrative which has further served to entrench the 
regime. Commonalities between the two cases are more obvious in the use of coercive 
capacity to combat domestic dissent. The only difference here is that Russia has yet to face a 
domestic challenge on the scale of the Gezi Park protests. Indeed the regime’s response to the 
2011-12 protests suggests the regime is more likely to adopt a pragmatic approach in order to 
maintain its stability. In Turkey, the regime’s increasingly hard edge following the 2013 Gezi 
protests, the government’s rift with the Gülen movement and the Kurdish conflict’s full re-
emergence in the 2015 summer, makes it probable that a more repressive stance will remain 
the norm. The violent coup attempt in July 2016, partially orchestrated by Gülenist circles 
within the military apparently, is likely to reinforce this development. 
3.2. Extractive capacity 
As noted above, a state’s ability to extract sufficient resources to fund its activities forms the 
basis of strong state capacity. Russia’s economic crisis of 1998 culminating in the 
devaluation of the rouble and the default on foreign loans was partly the result of the decline 
in world oil prices but, more importantly, it was also the outcome of a hugely inefficient tax 
system and an ingrained resistance to paying taxes on the part of powerful regions and 
corporations (Taylor 2011, 100). Russia’s weakened fiscal capacity by the end of the 1990s 
was primarily the outcome of its choice of revenue extraction. The redistribution of resources 
after the collapse of communism was very much an elite phenomenon, a strategy of elite 
bargaining at the centre of the state’s revenue extraction. This was essentially a system which 
drew on the practices of the old command economy combined with the new conditions of the 
transition economy and was based on a set of informal elite relations between regional 
governors, corporate directors and private financiers (Easter 2002). Brinkmanship typified the 
1990s with powerful Russian regions negotiating preferable tax deals with an increasingly 
weakened centre. Neither could the state rely on tax revenues from the corporate sector which 
was busy cutting deals with central government to reduce their tax burdens in return for 
significantly decreasing the cost of supplying goods and services to the public sector. By 
1997, this arrangement alone was costing the Russian state 30 billion dollars a year (Easter 
2002, 617).  
The capacity of the Russian state to collect taxes has improved under Putin following the 
reining in of regional power and the ‘taming of the oligarchs’. The administration should also 
be credited for increasing revenue extraction through a series of tax reforms early in Putin’s 
first term (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2004). However, the problem remains for Russia in 
that, like many Middle Eastern states, state revenue is derived almost entirely from natural 
resources. Not only does this have serious implications for Russia’s continued economic 
development it also undermines its state capacity.  States that are able to develop a more 
inclusive, wider, dispersed model of tax collection are likely to exhibit greater state capacity. 
The taxing of hydrocarbons where the state is in control of the sector is relatively easy. A 
much greater degree of administrative capacity is required to tax millions of citizens than a 
few oil giants. Extraction of rents, however, is only half the picture. More importantly, the 
way in which rent is redistributed is a key factor which, to date, has served to consolidate the 
Putin regime. 
Russian oil and gas rents serve two main purposes.  Firstly, they have been used to subsidize 
Russia’s unprofitable dependent sector and maintain acceptable levels of employment. 
Secondly they have been used to secure support for the regime from the wider population, 
particularly pensioners, and those whose salaries are paid by the state such as doctors, nurses 
and teachers, civil servants and the security services. All of these groups have enjoyed 
increases in salaries, pensions and benefits during the Putin years as a direct result of the 
redistribution of rents (Kastueva-Jean 2015, 11). However, the long-term sustainability of this 
model is questionable. As Connolly notes, enterprises in the over taxed rent-producing sector 
have little incentive in investing in developing infrastructure leading inevitably to declining 
production (exacerbated currently by depressed oil prices) and a concomitant decline in the 
amount of rent available to prop up the dependent sector (2015, 15). 
Whilst Russia’s extractive capacity has stabilized and consolidated the Putin regime by 
utilizing rent from the gas and oil sector to keep political elites on board and to protect the 
dependent sector, a state with such a narrow model of tax collection cannot be said to have 
strong and sustainable extractive capacity. Moreover, the declining price of oil not only 
undermines the Russian state’s extractive capacity, but also threatens the regime’s hitherto 
successful strategy of rent distribution. Efforts to move away from the rentier model have, 
indeed, been made through a series of anti-crisis measures in 2015. The risks, in terms of 
undermining popular and economic elite support for the regime have been recognized (Mau, 
2016). It was clear that, with the slowdown of the Russian economy since 2009 and the strain 
on the regime’s capacity to use rents to maintain support, an alternative means of 
mobilization was required. The nationalist turn in Russian politics during Putin’s third term 
following the annexation of Crimea and support for Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine 
appears, in the short term, to have successfully replaced the benefits of economic growth in 
providing effective means of mobilizing regime support. 
In the Turkish case, state capacity has traditionally suffered from significant weaknesses in 
collecting tax revenue, highly uneven rates of economic development and the persistent 
presence of a large grey sector, estimated to constitute a third of economic activity. Adaman 
and Çarkoğlu (2013, 250) show that widespread tax evasion in society is conditioned by low 
trust in political institutions and the state. Unlike Russia, Turkey never had recourse to any 
valuable energy resources with which to offset this. Nevertheless, following a severe 
economic crash in 2002, the imposition of a very effective IMF reform programme and the 
emergence of a EU membership prospect, the economy went through a period of robust 
economic growth in the following decade. The country became regarded as a BRICS-style 
economic powerhouse with exports standing at $115bn in 2011 (Herzog 2014, 11). However, 
due to the chronic condition of low tax receipts and private savings this economic growth was 
highly dependent on foreign capital, much of it speculative, and a favourable climate of 
global liquidity to finance state investments and balance the current account deficit. Persistent 
crises in the global economy in recent years, the unstable aftermath of the 2011 Arab 
uprisings as well as domestic political turmoil in Turkey however have clipped economic 
growth in the last years and held off badly-needed foreign direct investment. 
This overall dynamic became combined with a reinforced tendency in recent years of the 
AKP government to instrumentalize its central control over investments, privatization and 
tenders as a neo-patrimonial basis to consolidate its position by binding friendly economic 
interests to it. Simultaneously, oppositional business groups were sometimes punished either 
through large tax fines, as with the Dogan media group in 2009, or the direct take-over of 
companies in recent years, as with the Gülenist Asya Bank and the Zaman newspaper group. 
In the second half of the AKP’s rule, economic and financial policy- and decision-making has 
been re-centralized with formal and bureaucratic processes and rules increasingly ‘side-
stepped’ in favour of informal networks and relations (Bekmen 2014, 72). Real-estate, 
property and the construction sector have become key sectors of rent distribution to which 
economic activity has increasingly gravitated (Pérouse 2015, 172).  
Like Turkey, it was seen that Russia experienced a decade of economic growth benefitting 
from the favourable global economic climate and high oil and gas prices which strengthened 
the Putin regime. The petrol-dependency of the economy and the government’s control over 
it provide a powerful source of rent income and political tool for domestic domination that 
the Turkish regime lacks. However, when it comes to the subordination of economic interest 
groups in Russia and their institutionalization within the Putin regime as evidenced by the 
Khodorkovsky case, one has seen a similar dynamic becoming increasingly visible in Turkey 
in recent years accompanying the overall authoritarian shift. 
3.3. Administrative capacity  
Administrative capacity is inherently more challenging to measure than both coercive and 
extractive capacity. One might consider institutional quality or the capacity to deliver public 
services and maintain a country’s infrastructure, for instance. Here we focus on two central 
features of governance: the enforcement of property rights and the state’s capacity to 
effectively tackle corruption.  
The recognition and defence of property rights might be seen as a cornerstone of state 
capacity. However, we should recognize that a state that is sufficiently capable of enforcing 
property rights may also be strong enough to confiscate wealth and property (Fortin 2010, 
662). Whilst there have been some improvements in Russian state capacity in the realm of 
property rights during the Putin era, there are important caveats. The state’s role in regulating 
the economic sphere was indeed minimal during the ‘bandit capitalism’ years of the early 
1990s when Russia’s private economy was effectively ruled over by organized criminal 
groups, private security agencies and ‘moonlighting’ state police and security officers. 
Extortion rackets and contract killings were commonplace (Gans-Morse 2013, 262; Volkov 
2002, 1). On coming to power, Vladimir Putin emphasized that the protection of property 
rights was to be a key task of Russian law enforcement (Taylor 2011, 102).  
However, since 2000, the bandit has effectively been replaced by corrupt state officials who 
have been able to use judicial and coercive powers to aid aggressive enterprise takeovers 
(Volkov 2002, 1). The state’s sequestration of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Yukos oil 
corporation (whose assets were secretively transferred to the state-owned Rosneft oil 
company while the former Yukos chief languished in a Siberian jail) may be a high profile 
example but Gans-Morse highlights the routinized harassment of businesses by low-paid, 
low-level state officials often acting on behalf of competitors in disputes (2012, 279-80). 
Putin’s reassertion of state power in the sphere of property rights, therefore, has provided 
greater opportunities for state officials to use arbitrary coercion and has not enhanced either 
the rule of law or greater regulative capacity (Tompson 2005).  
Corruption is a key indicator of the state’s capability to regulate transactions and is at the 
heart of any definition of state capacity (Fortin 2010, 664). The degree to which corruption is 
controlled, coupled with the maintenance of high levels of transparency and accountability in 
governmental institutions further contributes to the strength of the state (Fukuyama 2004, 22). 
Corruption weakens state capacity through the siphoning of state resources and its very 
existence weakens the state by undermining public support in state institutions.  Any 
investigation into a state’s capacity cannot, therefore, ignore the issue of corruption and the 
steps taken by the state to counter it. Both Presidents Putin and Medvedev have 
acknowledged the threat posed by the pervasive nature of corruption in Russia. In 2006 Putin 
contrasted his administration with the lawlessness of the Yeltsin era but admitted that 
corruption remained a serious problem (Putin, 2006). During his four years in office (2008-
12) Dmitry Medvedev made fighting corruption one of the cornerstones of his presidency, 
unveiling a National Anti-Corruption plan in 2010 aimed at mobilising the state and civil 
society in the war on corruption.  On his return to the presidency, Putin revisited the topic, 
highlighting poor governmental efficiency and corruption as factors that were not compatible 
with the type of ‘modern public administration’ he wished to see develop in Russia (Putin, 
2012). Despite the concerns consistently expressed by both presidents it is clear that, faced 
with the enormity of the task, there has been a lack of political will to tackle corruption.   
However, whilst the persistence and pervasiveness of corruption in post-Soviet Russia clearly 
undermines infrastructural state capacity it also plays an important role in sustaining regime 
capacity. As Darden argues, graft (or political corruption) can serve as a form of ‘unofficial 
compensation that reinforces rather than undermines the formal institutions of the state’ 
(2008, 36). Practices seen as being corrupt in Western democracies are embedded in the 
Russian system and indeed necessary for that system to function (Tsygankov 2014, 180). 
In Turkey, although legal frameworks on property rights have existed since the late Ottoman 
period and were further strengthened following the 1946 introduction of multi-party 
elections, recurring periods of political and macro-economic instability kept them relatively 
weak (Pamuk 2008, 299). The emergence of EU membership prospects in 1999 led to an 
improvement of property rights frameworks and in 2003 legislation was drafted to solidify 
them (Gürleyen 2014, 122). A 2006 EU accession progress report stated that property rights 
enforcement was sufficiently established in legal frameworks although their implementation 
was patchy (Faucompret and Konings 2006, 69). However, the state can easily confiscate and 
expropriate land property under ‘public good’ provisions and, as previously stated, has also 
increasingly resorted to placing economic holdings under direct administration or put 
pressure to have them sold off. 
Although corruption is a widespread phenomenon in Turkey, the shift from import 
substitution industrialization in the 1980s towards a free market economy integrated into 
global markets led to a marked increase in corrupt government practices (Kayaalp 2015, 25). 
By the early 2000s a strong push was made towards formulating anti-corruption policies 
based on good governance and signing up to major international and EU treaties like the 
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (2003), the Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption (2003), and the UN Convention against Corruption (2006). 
Initially the AKP initially actively campaigned against corrupt governance practices and in its 
early period several legislative packages focusing partly on anti-corruption measures were 
pushed through. These efforts had a positive effect in the mid-2000s as international indices 
such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) showed although it 
also captured how the situation again deteriorated in recent years (Ulusoy 2014, 4-5). The 
2015 CPI notes a ‘marked deterioration’ in Turkey (Transparency International 2016, 13). In 
a 2015 TI survey half the respondents stated that corruption had increased in recent years 
with a culture of impunity existing within public institutions, municipal administrations and 
political parties (Uluslararası Şeffaflik Derneği 2015, 8-9). 
The AKP’s electoral dominance since 2002 led to the establishment of a hegemonic party 
system that weakened the political opposition’s ability to play an effective role and enabled 
increasing power fusion and state capture. This dynamic has encouraged increasing non-
transparency, abuse of power and the onset of pervasive corruption within the ruling circle. 
According to Bedirhanoğlu (2015), corruption became unprecedentedly ‘systematic and 
institutionalized’, particularly in the latter half of the AKP’s period in office. In this context, 
in December 2013 a large judiciary corruption investigation was pointing to involvement at 
the highest levels of government (Savran 2015, 82-83). Although this investigation was 
sparked by the intra-regime rivalry between the Erdoğan and Gülenist camps, it spotlighted 
deep governmental interlinkages with systematic, pervasive corruption. These dealings 
particularly regarding wide-scale urban redevelopment, the construction industry and 
privatization efforts allowed the creation of informal and discretionary funds (Bedirhanoğlu 
2015). Through these neo-patrimonial linkages and networks, it benefited from being a 
central player in corrupt governance practices by strengthening its own regime at the expense 
of state capacity. 
In both cases, the development of administrative state capacity has been ignored whilst the 
precariousness of property rights and the lack of political will to seriously tackle corrupt 
practices have reinforced neo-patrimonialism. The interesting difference and one which again 
points to the greater stability of the Russian regime is the issue of elite cohesion. In Russia, 
the redistribution of rents, in part the result of weak property rights and endemic corruption, 
has worked to keep elites on board. As Taylor succinctly puts it, the Russian ruling elite have 
been ‘more interested in looting the state than building it’ (2011, 310-11). The reassertion of 
state power in Russia has not been reflected in a greater regulative capacity but the increased 
provision of informal rent redistribution. Similarly, authoritarian transformations in Turkey 
reversed a trend towards more effective and transparent regulatory governance and facilitated 
the pervasion of informal clientelism as a crucial plank of regime building and consolidation 
but they also unleashed severe internal conflicts at elite level over control of the party, the 
government and the state. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite its state-building rhetoric, the Putin administration has always been far more 
concerned with strengthening the regime. Central to this project has been the extraction and 
redistribution of rents from the oil and gas sector, the tolerance of high levels of corruption, 
the use of coercive tactics to marginalize political and civil opposition and the mobilising of 
regime support through economic and nationalist appeals. Any incentive to increase state 
capacity is outweighed by a desire to maintain regime stability. The preservation of the 
regime has become the key goal for the Russian ruling elite. During the Medvedev 
‘interregnum’ (2008-12) period the narrative of modernization  suggested this model could be 
challenged but it has become increasingly evident that even if a constituency within the elite 
were to seek changes aimed at increasing state capacity by improving the quality of 
governance, such ‘good intentions’ would make little headway. Political actors lack 
incentives to carry out reforms and in any event would swiftly realize the impossibility of 
implementing changes without also risking their own positions (Gel’man 2011, 225-226). As 
Robinson notes, the rejection of Medvedev’s modernization project effectively meant that the 
only option for the regime was to restore Putin’s dominance of the political system and 
develop a ‘cultural turn’ in which conservative Russian traditionalism would be promoted in 
order to stabilize the neo-patrimonial system (2014, 26-7). Bolstered by events in Ukraine 
and the promotion of anti-Western sentiment in response to sanctions, this cultural turn has 
indeed stabilized Russia but at a cost. Russian governance seems destined to stagnate, 
evoking notions of the phenomenon of zastoi (stagnation) associated with the late Brezhnev 
period. As Robinson concludes, the Ukrainian crisis will not last for ever and in time the 
regime will be confronted again with the need to address its weak state capacity or to find 
another means of mobilising sufficient support to sustain the regime (2014, 36-7). 
In the Turkish case, the AKP’s origins in the traditionally marginalized political Islamist 
movement in a more polarized and fractured socio-political environment with considerably 
more resilient democratic institutions meant that it took longer to undertake a gradual 
authoritarian turn. The AKP first had to establish its political dominance through repeated 
electoral victories, partially based on presiding over a period of economic growth and 
stability and a reasonably inclusive catch-all electoral strategy. Furthermore, the party’s links 
to a wider political Islamist movement hampered the process of establishing sufficient elite 
cohesion around Erdoğan’s exclusive leadership of the AKP. Indeed, the ‘civil-war’ (Savran 
2015, 82) inside the party and state with the religious Gülen movement since winter 2013 
which extended into the July 2016 coup attempt exemplifies this very well. The Turkish 
state’s coercive, extractive and administrative capacities were not instrumentalized as capably 
as in Russia for the sake of regime building as the authoritarian shift only began to take off in 
earnest in 2010-2011 allowing for far less time. The unavailability of stable sources of rentier 
income meant it was more difficult to maintain the loyalty of political and business elites as 
well as wider society through sufficient and pervasive rent distribution. Moreover, Turkey’s 
economic troubles in recent years, based on its reliance on external investment and low tax 
receipts as well as private savings, damaged the government’s narrative of competent 
economic governance.  
The increasing resort to repressive authoritarianism in recent years in Turkey’s electoral 
democratic polity seemed to have sufficiently deterred any further lateral and horizontal 
challenges, facilitating regime consolidation. However, the July 2016 coup attempt 
highlighted the extent to which elite conflicts and lateral challenges, the latest from within the 
armed forces, persist. This came at the expense of exacerbating an overarching sense of 
institutional and societal uncertainty and polarization, compounded by the regional turmoil 
following the Arab Uprisings and the renewed Kurdish conflict. This political atmosphere 
and the steady authoritarian regime building since 2010-11 re-activated identitarian cleavage 
structures in Turkish politics that made the AKP’s consensualist, catch-all image 
unsustainable and made it adopt an increasingly religio-conservative, nationalist discourse. 
The AKP’s November 2015 re-election with a renewed single-party mandate and a clear 
parliamentary majority seemingly reflected popular preferences for stable if authoritarian 
governance and regime building during a period of domestic instability and unrest. This 
however also came at the expense of diminishing the state and government’s capacity to 
address major problems and issues such as the Kurdish conflict through democratic politics 
and governance. 
 
From a comparative perspective the Russian and Turkish cases have much to contribute, 
providing fertile soil for the study of state capacity and illiberal or non-democratic regimes. 
One valuable lesson might be to focus less on simply labelling such systems as competitive 
or electoral authoritarian and to concern ourselves rather more with the degree of government 
and the state’s capacity to govern (Stoner-Weiss 2011, 11-12). Both cases but perhaps the 
Russian case in particular, alert us to the dangers of viewing the building of state capacity as 
crucial in determining the long-term survival of the state, be it democratic or authoritarian. As 
Andersen et al note for an autocratic ruler with sufficient support and resources to resist 
external challenges, the building of conventional state capacity may be unnecessary (2014, 
1317).  
Both the Putin and Erdoğan regimes have rejected the challenge of tackling the long-term 
development of state capacity in favour of the short-term utilization of what state capacity 
exists to bolster and consolidate the regime itself. While both regimes may appear 
impregnable as a result of this strategy, the long-term durability of neo-patrimonialism can be 
questioned. Continued economic decline, exacerbated in the Russian case by Western 
sanctions, may put intolerable strains on the rentier model. The Putin regime has already 
responded to the undermining of its rent redistribution model by adopting an overtly national-
patriotic appeal in the wake of the Ukraine crisis which has successfully served to mobilize 
regime support. Russia’s ‘national turn’ can only ever be a short-term measure and the 
Kremlin’s apparent impregnability began to be questioned in 2016 in view of its lack of 
capacity to reform, its inability to address its worsening economic plight and its increasingly 
dysfunctional infrastructure (Petrov 2016; Motyl 2016). To ensure long-term survival both 
regimes will need to identify other means of mobilising sufficient support or increase levels 
of coercion to counter increasing social unrest. A further option for both Russia and Turkey 
would be to turn their attention to the development of state capacity through the 
implementation of thorough-going political and economic reforms. Such a change in strategy 
would inevitably lead to regime change and so, as long as regime survival remains the key 
objective for political elites in both countries, regime strengthening is likely to remain a far 
more attractive proposition than the building of state capacity.  
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